ethnic 'sub-stratum' and Ernest Gellner, who stresses the 'modernity' of nationalism. The former included both proponents of true 'Islam' itself, and those in the West who, with greater or lesser justice, have been termed 'orientalists', that is, those who argued that the Islamic world was dominated by a set of relatively enduring and unchanging processes and meanings, to be understood through the texts of Islam itself and the language it generated.4 For both these groups, the Islamists and the orientalists, the rise of the Islamist movement raised very few methodological or analytical questions, since it merely revealed the 'true' character of these countries. Indeed, it is remarkable that in the mass of literature produced since the late 1970s on the Islamic upsurge very few are from these schools -precisely because, within this framework, there is very little new to explain.
Against this approach, there emerged a substantial body of literature that denied any essence to 'Islam', whether defined by believers or social scientists, and instead looked at these Islamist movements as products of late twentiethcentury society. If this latter literature were to be summarized, then at least three strands would be contained in it.5 First, much of this writing on Islamist movements stressed not their invocation of 'tradition', or of a return to the past, but their contemporaneity and modernity: they were responses to problems experienced in these societies in the contemporary world -corrupt states, mass unemployment, chaotic urbanization, a sense of external domination, spurious democratic systems. The very programmes the fundamentalists offered and the ideas they propounded were, for all their Koranic and religious form, similar to those of other Third World radical and populist movements, emphasizing such themes as oppression and liberation, corruption and authenticity, elite and mass.6 There are significant differences between classical populism and Contemporaneite, 1990 ). My one disagreement with Abrahamian is that, while he argues that the terms 'fundamentalist' and 'populist' are incompatible, fundamentalism, not least the former' s secular, often anti-clerical, character, its invocation of the working class, and the role played within it by the armed forces: but there is also substantial thematic and social overlap. The widespread rejection of democracy and of ideas of cosmopolitanism and internationalism, albeit phrased in Islamic terms, are a reflection of this common condition. The Iranian revolution and its aftermath have been accompanied by the emergence of a new vocabulary of politics, either redefining and reviving old words, or creating new ones.7 In his analysis of Arabic and other Islamist discourses, Aziz al-Azmeh shows how its category of the state is derived from the Jacobin model.8 Secondly, for all the appearance of a single, pan-Islamic current, and the reality of co-operation and inspiration linking these movements, the Islamists varied considerably between countries, depending on the religious, political and social character of each: thus, in some (for example, Iran) the leadership was clerical, whilst in others it was lay (North Africa); in Iran the movement was almost wholly urban, in neighbouring Afghanistan it was rural (albeit under leadership of urban intellectuals or notables). Thirdly, the literature stressed that the rise of the Islamist movements was not just a return to some 'true' or 'authentic' tradition, but a response, at the level of peoples as much as intellectuals, to the perceived failures of the post-independence regimes, whose corruption and inefficiency, and pure arrogance, had alienated the populations over whom they ruled: this was true in the Algeria of the FLN and the Libya of Qaddafi as in post-Nasserist Egypt and the Shah's Iran.9
The rise of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the Palestinian territories has been based on hostility to the perceived inefficiency and corruption of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which, although not in power, had behaved with many of the characteristics of a nationalist regime; that of Refah in Turkey is against the Kemalist state. What defines these movements as 'political' is, therefore, not just the context in which they arise and the language they use, but their goals and the means they used to achieve that goal: the goal is political power, control of the state and the maintenance of that control. The means have been an eminently secular set of options, from general strikes and mass demonstrations (as in Iran), to guerrilla war (Afghanistan), assassination (Egypt, Algeria), infiltration of the armed forces (*"note continued)
I would prefer to suggest that the Iranian case was precisely one in which these two elements overlapped, and that there are certain respects in which the Iranian movement conflicted with the Latin American populist model. fundamentalism, not least the former' s secular, often anti-clerical, character, its invocation of the working class, and the role played within it by the armed forces: but there is also substantial thematic and social overlap. The widespread rejection of democracy and of ideas of cosmopolitanism and internationalism, albeit phrased in Islamic terms, are a reflection of this common condition. The Iranian revolution and its aftermath have been accompanied by the emergence of a new vocabulary of politics, either redefining and reviving old words, or creating new ones.7 In his analysis of Arabic and other Islamist discourses, Aziz al-Azmeh shows how its category of the state is derived from the Jacobin model.8 Secondly, for all the appearance of a single, pan-Islamic current, and the reality of co-operation and inspiration linking these movements, the Islamists varied considerably between countries, depending on the religious, political and social character of each: thus, in some (for example, Iran) the leadership was clerical, whilst in others it was lay (North Africa); in Iran the movement was almost wholly urban, in neighbouring Afghanistan it was rural (albeit under leadership of urban intellectuals or notables). Thirdly, the literature stressed that the rise of the Islamist movements was not just a return to some 'true' or 'authentic' tradition, but a response, at the level of peoples as much as intellectuals, to the perceived failures of the post-independence regimes, whose corruption and inefficiency, and pure arrogance, had alienated the populations over whom they ruled: this was true in the Algeria of the FLN and the Libya of Qaddafi as in post-Nasserist Egypt and the Shah's Iran.9
I would prefer to suggest that the Iranian case was precisely one in which these two elements overlapped, and that there are certain respects in which the Iranian movement conflicted with the Latin American populist model. (Egypt), and the extension of alternative social services (Lebanon, Algeria). Even where hitherto religious forms of activity have been used -the mass prayer meeting, the gathering of Muslims at Mecca for the hajj -this has been for political purposes. It is, therefore, as aspirants to political power, and as exercisers of it, that the Islamist movements merit particular attention. In the light of developments both political and academic, it may now. be possible to look again at the rise of Islamism and examine in more detail some of the issues raised in this first reaction. In what follows, four such issues and the literature pertaining to them will be examined: the international dimensions of the Islamist movements, or 'Islamic threat'; the record of Islamist movements in power; the changing character of Islamist movements themselves; the framework of social science work on Islamic societies.
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
Since the 1970s, the theme of an international 'Islamic Threat' has become prominent in political discussion in the West. The first re-emergence of this stereotype was a result of the broader repercussions of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the subsequent strengthening of Islamist movements elsewhere. The components of this international 'threat' are known to all: embassies and their occupants seized, terrorist attacks on planes and civilians, rhetoric about chopping off the hands of 'imperialism', the growth in Europe of the coercive veiling of women. To these themes of the early part of the 1980s has now been added a new one: the claim, voiced by some within the Islamic world, that with the fall of communism it is 'Islam' which will provide the major challenge to the West, and a more long-lasting and tenacious one at that. There are several evident problems with this picture, much as it is espoused by elements on both sides of the supposed 'Islam-West' divide. The first is that, even if one concedes that they aspire to challenge the West, it greatly overstates the strength of the Islamic countries, in military, political or economic terms. Militarily there has been no serious strategic threat from the Islamic world since the Turks were turned back at Lepanto (1517) and Vienna (1683). Politically, Islam is quite different from communism in that it is not able to mobilize support from significant sections of the population in Western societies: the presence of around 6 million Muslims in western Europe, a result of migration since the Second World War, may pose a range of social and economic problems, but is hardly a threat to the 260 million other people who live in these countries. The Islamic and Islamist movements active in western Europe, in themselves fragmented, are concerned more with religious issues within the community, or with political developments in the Middle East and South Asia, than with affecting the political character of western Europe: the two most explosive issues of recent years, the Satanic Verses affair in Britain, and the dispute over foulards, or headscarves, in France, were not directed at non-Muslim society but were perceived by Muslims as responses to hostility towards Muslim (Egypt), and the extension of alternative social services (Lebanon, Algeria). Even where hitherto religious forms of activity have been used -the mass prayer meeting, the gathering of Muslims at Mecca for the hajj -this has been for political purposes. It is, therefore, as aspirants to political power, and as exercisers of it, that the Islamist movements merit particular attention.
In the light of developments both political and academic, it may now. be possible to look again at the rise of Islamism and examine in more detail some of the issues raised in this first reaction. In what follows, four such issues and the literature pertaining to them will be examined: the international dimensions of the Islamist movements, or 'Islamic threat'; the record of Islamist movements in power; the changing character of Islamist movements themselves; the framework of social science work on Islamic societies.
Since the 1970s, the theme of an international 'Islamic Threat' has become prominent in political discussion in the West. The first re-emergence of this stereotype was a result of the broader repercussions of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the subsequent strengthening of Islamist movements elsewhere. The components of this international 'threat' are known to all: embassies and their occupants seized, terrorist attacks on planes and civilians, rhetoric about chopping off the hands of 'imperialism', the growth in Europe of the coercive veiling of women. To these themes of the early part of the 1980s has now been added a new one: the claim, voiced by some within the Islamic world, that with the fall of communism it is 'Islam' which will provide the major challenge to the West, and a more long-lasting and tenacious one at that. There are several evident problems with this picture, much as it is espoused by elements on both sides of the supposed 'Islam-West' divide. The first is that, even if one concedes that they aspire to challenge the West, it greatly overstates the strength of the Islamic countries, in military, political or economic terms. Militarily there has been no serious strategic threat from the Islamic world since the Turks were turned back at Lepanto (1517) and Vienna (1683). Politically, Islam is quite different from communism in that it is not able to mobilize support from significant sections of the population in Western societies: the presence of around 6 million Muslims in western Europe, a result of migration since the Second World War, may pose a range of social and economic problems, but is hardly a threat to the 260 million other people who live in these countries. The Islamic and Islamist movements active in western Europe, in themselves fragmented, are concerned more with religious issues within the community, or with political developments in the Middle East and South Asia, than with affecting the political character of western Europe: the two most explosive issues of recent years, the Satanic Verses affair in Britain, and the dispute over foulards, or headscarves, in France, were not directed at non-Muslim society but were perceived by Muslims as responses to hostility towards Muslim communities from the non-Muslim world.'? Moreover, while the Islamists are not short of their own rhetoric of denunciation and demagogy, much of the language and practice of confrontation comes not from the Islamists at all but from those opposed to them, or who find in them a convenient scapegoat -be it Orthodox Christians in Serbia and Greece, or right-wing parties in France, Germany, Holland or Denmark. The 'threat' is often a projection of the aggression of non-Muslims. This theme is well explored in the work of German scholars, where the concept of 'hostile image' (German Feindbild) is used to examine the composite image of the threatening Islamic world in Western society, combining revived historic themes (Muslim 'expansion', enmity to Christianity, etc.) with contemporary issues (oil, hostages, terrorism, administrative and commercial corruption)." In a parallel disaggregation, John Esposito, an American expert on the politics of the Islamic world, has set out to counter this myth, and to disentangle its various components.14 He examines how, within a range of Islamic countries, . Some have queried the validity of the term 'second republic' on the grounds that it overstates the discontinuity between the Khomeini and post-Khomeini periods; but the case for using the term is certainly defensible, given the important constitutional changes that followed Khomeini's death, with the formation of a presidential system. provided.24 Saudi Arabia is not a democracy, and it is therefore difficult to assess the causes or impact of political changes that can be observed from outside: but it would seem, at the least, plausible that the changes in regime policy -for example, on political representation, on oil output, on foreign policy questions -respond to very real pressures on it. It is trying, with calculation, to respond to these in order to protect its own hold on power and wealth, if also to protect the Holy Places of Islam. A study of Saudi policy with regard to the international media -press, satellite, news agencies -might reveal at least as much of the material and the political as of the spiritual in these ventures.
Representatives provided.24 Saudi Arabia is not a democracy, and it is therefore difficult to assess the causes or impact of political changes that can be observed from outside: but it would seem, at the least, plausible that the changes in regime policy -for example, on political representation, on oil output, on foreign policy questions -respond to very real pressures on it. It is trying, with calculation, to respond to these in order to protect its own hold on power and wealth, if also to protect the Holy Places of Islam. A study of Saudi policy with regard to the international media -press, satellite, news agencies -might reveal at least as much of the material and the political as of the spiritual in these ventures. Representatives of Islamist states and movements make much of the apparent Western hostility to their religion and aspirations, yet many of the most critical studies come from within their own societies. Thus, in his introduction to The Pakistan Experience Asghar Khan writes of how the Muslim world is dominated by the struggle against obscurantism: 'This battle against ignorance and exploitation, which most of the Muslim World has yet to win, is made more complicated by the exploitation of religion by vested interests; monarchs, mullahs, dictators, usurpers and opportunists'.25 A critical account of the course of the Iranian regime is given in Fariba Adelkhah and others in Thermidor en Iran.26 In addition to the widespread human rights violations, the authors point out how the regime has introduced its own, peculiar and new dogmatic interpretation of religion and has created, or better re-created, a state with many of the features of the previous, royal and secular, regime. Thus it relies on a managed system of distribution of oil revenues and on corruption to maintain political control even as it pursues Persian nationalism within (vis-a-vis the 50 per cent of the population who are not Persians) and without. As they themselves put it, this regime is distinctive in comparison with other modern revolutionary regimes in that it is 'authoritarian, but not totalitarian', meaning that there is a greater degree of diversity -of opinions, political trends, economic activitiesthan in other moder revolutionary states. However, what is perhaps the greatest failing of this regime, again in contrast to other revolutionary states, is the lack of any economic programme: the concept of iqtisad-i tauhidi -so-called Islamic or 'unitary' economics -proclaimed at the time of the revolution has turned out to be a combination of statist incompetence and populist platitudes. The obsessive and cruel concern with matters of dress and social conduct contrasts with the lack of ideas, and indeed interest, with regard to economics.
In another, more cultural and long-terrno perspective, these failures are The real danger of Islamization lies not in its excesses, its random changes of direction, its blind groping, its utter obsolescence, but in the fact that, being incapable of setting up a structured historical order, it produces chaos; and this favours the more subversive and sinister elements who loiter in the corridors of powers waiting for their time to come. Absolutely anything can emerge from this Pandora's box: the most improbable and appalling monsters in the political menagerie, from Gaddafi to Pol Pot via the whole spectrum of crazed visionaries. For the cult of revolution becomes an end in itself, sets up its own demonology. Islam is blundering through adventures which are wholly foreign to its meaning and purpose. It has already injured itself badly, for in trying to rise above history it has become one of history's by-products, just another ideological blind alley.28
THE 'NEW' ISLAMISM
This raises the question of how, even within the past few years, the social character of these movements may have changed. This internal development is the subject of Olivier Roy's important study of the 'crisis' of political Islam.29 Roy, author of an earlier and more sympathetic work on the opposition movements in Afghanistan, sets out here a critique of the 'neofundamentalists' who have come to dominate the movements in Iran, Afghanistan and North Africa. He argues that the crisis of political Islam reflects several trends: that in contrast to the earlier generation of leaders, who were versed in Islamic learning and law, the new leadership are political opportunists, using bits of tradition for their own purposes; that they lack any coherent view of how to reorganize society in the late twentieth century, not least in the field of economics; and that, increasingly, Islamist movements are being taken over 27 The real danger of Islamization lies not in its excesses, its random changes of direction, its blind groping, its utter obsolescence, but in the fact that, being incapable of setting up a structured historical order, it produces chaos; and this favours the more subversive and sinister elements who loiter in the corridors of powers waiting for their time to come. Absolutely anything can emerge from this Pandora's box: the most improbable and appalling monsters in the political menagerie, from Gaddafi to Pol Pot via the whole spectrum of crazed visionaries. Challenging as it is, however, it is difficult to accept Gellner's argument in either its original or later forms. The initial problem with Gellner's account is that it is based on an extrapolation to the Middle East as a whole of a specific, North African history. It also overstates the compatibility of the scholarly tradition with modernity: the interest of the defenders of the 'high' tradition in opposing modernity, and in particular rational, individualist and open thinking, is obscured. Moreover the more recent evolution of mass fundamentalism, itself a reflection of the failures of the 'high', has led to a three-way split, between the 'high', 'low' and now 'lumpen' variants of Islamism, the latter involving the rejection of both the popular sentiments of the 'low' and the learning and traditional sense of political calculation and juridical authority of the 'high'. One can, indeed, rescue Weber by reference to the Islamic experience: secularization has, despite appearances, gone further than Gellner implies: yet, when it has not, there has been stagnation, a point Gellner recognizes albeit inadequately in regard to the economy.32
ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETY
In contrast to the literature surveyed so far, which approaches Islamic societies and their politics in terms of religion and Islamist movements, there is another body of work that seeks, first, to provide a general understanding of how these societies work, and then proceeds to locate the particular, contingent role of religious belief and organization within it. In essence, the answer to the question of 'Islam' which these studies provide is first to analyse the society in question and then to discuss particular Islamic phenomena. In a more contemporary vein, a number of important general studies of Arab society have recently been produced which exemplify this overall approach. Hisham Sharabi's Neopatriarchy is one of the most perceptive, and critical, books to be published on Arab society for a long time:33 combining insights from Marx and Freud he develops a concept of 'neopatriarchy' as an alternative to modernity, a form of behaviour with social, political and psychological dimensions common to Arab society and both embodying and confirming its paralysis. While critical of the false solutions 'high' literate or scholarly one, and a 'low' popular or folk one.31 Islamism, or as he characteristically termed it, 'Che Khomeinism', represented a movement by the high leadership, such as Khomeini, mobilizing and controlling the believers, and at the expense of popular Islam: it could, therefore, favour a modernizing state. According to Gellner, Weberian expectations about the need for secularization have, therefore, been proved wrong.
Challenging as it is, however, it is difficult to accept Gellner's argument in either its original or later forms. The initial problem with Gellner's account is that it is based on an extrapolation to the Middle East as a whole of a specific, North African history. It also overstates the compatibility of the scholarly tradition with modernity: the interest of the defenders of the 'high' tradition in opposing modernity, and in particular rational, individualist and open thinking, is obscured. Moreover the more recent evolution of mass fundamentalism, itself a reflection of the failures of the 'high', has led to a three-way split, between the 'high', 'low' and now 'lumpen' variants of Islamism, the latter involving the rejection of both the popular sentiments of the 'low' and the learning and traditional sense of political calculation and juridical authority of the 'high'. One can, indeed, rescue Weber by reference to the Islamic experience: secularization has, despite appearances, gone further than Gellner implies: yet, when it has not, there has been stagnation, a point Gellner recognizes albeit inadequately in regard to the economy.32
In contrast to the literature surveyed so far, which approaches Islamic societies and their politics in terms of religion and Islamist movements, there is another body of work that seeks, first, to provide a general understanding of how these societies work, and then proceeds to locate the particular, contingent role of religious belief and organization within it. In essence, the answer to the question of 'Islam' which these studies provide is first to analyse the society in question and then to discuss particular Islamic phenomena. In a more contemporary vein, a number of important general studies of Arab society have recently been produced which exemplify this overall approach. Hisham Sharabi's Neopatriarchy is one of the most perceptive, and critical, books to be published on Arab society for a long time:33 combining insights from Marx and Freud he develops a concept of 'neopatriarchy' as an alternative to modernity, a form of behaviour with social, political and psychological dimensions common to Arab society and both embodying and confirming its paralysis. While critical of the false solutions of the revolutionary and nationalist movements, he is equally critical of the fundamentalists whose authoritarian and masculinist ideology he sees as another variant of neopatriarchy. Sharabi shares with Bassam Tibi and Darius Shayegan an emphasis on the inhibiting role of culture, and a view of how external domination, in various forms, has contributed to the creation of this malaise in Middle Eastern society: but he is also critical of Arab political and intellectual leaders, and astringent about the prospects for an improvement. In both analysis and tone he breaks with the polarities of the imperialist/anti-imperialist debate that has dominated, and warped, so much discussion of this region and produces a model of independent analysis.34 In a work of comparable range, and reflective depth, another Palestinian academic based in the United States, Halim Barakat, has produced a powerful account of the moder Arab world, combing social, cultural, psychological and political analysis.35 Like Sharabi, Barakat has shared, in earlier times, hopes for the secular and later religious radical movements: but his conclusion is now clear, that religion cannot provide the basis for a transformation of Arab society. Reforming intellectuals abstract the concepts of Islam from the context in which they originated and had meaning, they seek to create a new form of power; in the end, they have neither a vision nor a programme for the future.36
The approach and range of these two works by Palestinian intellectuals is matched in that of two Western writers who have provided studies of the contemporary politics and society of the Arab world. Roger Owen has attempted a general, accessible overview of the region's politics and in this he is more than successful, providing comprehensive analysis of the Arab states and the three non-Arab ones -Iran, Turkey, Israel.37 In common with others, he provides an explanation of the Islamist upsurge that is sensitive to its political and ideological peculiarities, but which sets it in a comparative, and social, context. His discussion of the Islamic Republic of Iran is particularly interesting, focusing on such issues as the role of the leader and its pluralism, in contrast to any specifically theological form. But Owen's book, building on the pioneering example of his earlier studies in economic history,38 also constitutes a theoretical critique of other, more 'orientalist' approaches: he advocates: 34 An example of how difficult it is to write in this vein is to be found in the reception, in the Arab Bromley argues that it is impossible to understand the Middle East in terms of models that distinguish it from the West: such understanding is not to be achieved by asking why the Middle East or other parts of the Third World 'failed' to develop as the West did, because it is the 'West' itself, and in particular the separation of the economy from the state, that requires explanation.42 What is needed, Bromley argues, is an analysis that leaves open the relation of the state to economics, and hence to civil society as a whole, and which draws up a series of empirically based, historical and comparative studies of societies as they came into contact with 'modernity': the latter, predominantly in the form of Western imperialism, had a major impact on the region, at once devastating and formative, but cannot be presented with a unique effectiveness, separate from the political and social forces operating within the societies of the region. Bromley gives several reasons for the weakness of democracy in the region inherent in the political system of its constituent states and rejects conventional explanations in terms of ideology: 'the relative absence of democracy in the Middle East has little to do with the region's Islamic culture and much to do with its particular pattern of state formation'.43
There are questions which this study leaves open, not least the precise ways in which ideology, in religious or secular form, serves to legitimate, or challenge, established states: it is one thing to say that it is shaped and used by social forces -'more an effect than a cause' in Bromley's words -another to say that it has no autonomous impact at all. But, as this book shows so clearly, any resolution of this question will involve a clarification of the role of political culture in theoretical and comparative terms, before any particular answers with regard to the Middle East can be produced. It would be difficult to overstate the theoretical range, and analytic insight, of Simon Bromley's book, one of the most original to be published on the Middle East, or indeed any part of the Third World, in recent years, and at the same time a stimulating contribution to social theory.
THE CHALLENGES OF METHOD
As the discussion of these works indicates, the analysis of the Islamist movements and of the societies in which they flourish raises not just questions of political analysis, but also of method. To the long-established debates on method -'historical' or 'scientific'-this region has added its own, that between the 'orientalists' and their critics. These have now been joined by a third, that associated with the critique of enlightenment rationality and with postmodernism. It may come as no surprise to discover that there are many There are questions which this study leaves open, not least the precise ways in which ideology, in religious or secular form, serves to legitimate, or challenge, established states: it is one thing to say that it is shaped and used by social forces -'more an effect than a cause' in Bromley's words -another to say that it has no autonomous impact at all. But, as this book shows so clearly, any resolution of this question will involve a clarification of the role of political culture in theoretical and comparative terms, before any particular answers with regard to the Middle East can be produced. It would be difficult to overstate the theoretical range, and analytic insight, of Simon Bromley's book, one of the most original to be published on the Middle East, or indeed any part of the Third World, in recent years, and at the same time a stimulating contribution to social theory.
As the discussion of these works indicates, the analysis of the Islamist movements and of the societies in which they flourish raises not just questions of political analysis, but also of method. To the long-established debates on method -'historical' or 'scientific'-this region has added its own, that between the 'orientalists' and their critics. These have now been joined by a third, that associated with the critique of enlightenment rationality and with postmodernism. It may come as no surprise to discover that there are many working in, and on, the region who have reacted enthusiastically to this new theoretical option: it appears to be a way of escaping from the constrictions of a knowledge associated with imperial domination, it offers a means of conveying the subjectivity and passion of Islamist movements themselves, and it offers, to the Islamists and their sympathizers, a modular system of ideas from which they can pick individual concepts without embracing a complete, and potentially alien, conceptual system. While some authors seem to be responding favourably to this possibility,44 others, veterans of other illusions and frustrated emancipations, have a more cautious view. Thus, Sharabi:
My feeling is that while the intellectual world of late capitalism perhaps can accommodate without much damage the aestheticism and scepticism of a Foucault or a Derrida, the intellectuals of the post-colonial periphery, including the Arab world, can ill afford the risks of philosophical and anti-theoretic scepticism; and even were they to take this risk, it would -probably -only lead them to political paralysis.45
The question of modernity and Islamism can be posed in at least two ways, derivative of the two meanings of modernity itself, namely as a system of rationalist thought, broadly derived from the enlightenment, and as a system of social organization, produced by the industrial revolution. It is certainly easy to see how the rise of Islamist movements can be considered as a rejection of modernity in this first, intellectual and philosophical sense, in that Islamism explicitly renounces some of the core tenets of that inheritance -secularism, individualism, tolerance, democracy, gender equality, among them. Many Islamists would claim this, as would many of their opponents, such as Shayegan, and as would, for their own purposes, postmodernists outside the Islamic world keen to identify movements that reinforce their claims on discursive pluralism and deconstruction. Yet even this argument can be questioned. If the rise of Islamism is proof of the end of modernity as a philosophical system, then the least one can say is that there are many other things that have happened in this century and indeed before which would qualify for such a role -extreme movements of the secular and racist right, and the mystique of social engineering on the left among them. Moreover, while the Islamists and their opponents claim that their ideology is anti-enlightenment and rejects modernity, the analysis of their ideas discussed above suggests that the verdict is far more mixed, that, in some sense, Islamism is a mixture, a hybrid, of modernity and anti-modernity. For all the latter that is present, there is also a recognition, a necessary incorporation, of ideas that are very much within the political spectrum of the enlightenment tradition. As with nationalisms, the framework of apparent working in, and on, the region who have reacted enthusiastically to this new theoretical option: it appears to be a way of escaping from the constrictions of a knowledge associated with imperial domination, it offers a means of conveying the subjectivity and passion of Islamist movements themselves, and it offers, to the Islamists and their sympathizers, a modular system of ideas from which they can pick individual concepts without embracing a complete, and potentially alien, conceptual system. While some authors seem to be responding favourably to this possibility,44 others, veterans of other illusions and frustrated emancipations, have a more cautious view. Thus, Sharabi:
The question of modernity and Islamism can be posed in at least two ways, derivative of the two meanings of modernity itself, namely as a system of rationalist thought, broadly derived from the enlightenment, and as a system of social organization, produced by the industrial revolution. It is certainly easy to see how the rise of Islamist movements can be considered as a rejection of modernity in this first, intellectual and philosophical sense, in that Islamism explicitly renounces some of the core tenets of that inheritance -secularism, individualism, tolerance, democracy, gender equality, among them. Many Islamists would claim this, as would many of their opponents, such as Shayegan, and as would, for their own purposes, postmodernists outside the Islamic world keen to identify movements that reinforce their claims on discursive pluralism and deconstruction. Yet even this argument can be questioned. If the rise of Islamism is proof of the end of modernity as a philosophical system, then the least one can say is that there are many other things that have happened in this century and indeed before which would qualify for such a role -extreme movements of the secular and racist right, and the mystique of social engineering on the left among them. Moreover, while the Islamists and their opponents claim that their ideology is anti-enlightenment and rejects modernity, the analysis of their ideas discussed above suggests that the verdict is far more mixed, that, in some sense, Islamism is a mixture, a hybrid, of modernity and anti-modernity. For all the latter that is present, there is also a recognition, a necessary incorporation, of ideas that are very much within the political spectrum of the enlightenment tradition. As with nationalisms, the framework of apparent rejection, in favour of irrationalism and particularism, contains a set of propositions that are both universal and derived from modernity. This is not to subscribe to Gellner' s view of an acceptable compatibility between 'high' Islam and modernity, let alone his denial of secularization: rather it shows how far, despite religious inhibitions, modernity and secularization have their impact. If this is so of the relation to modernity as an intellectual system, it is arguably even more so with regard to modernity as a social system. Theorists of modernity, be they Marx and Weber, stressed the degree to which this system, or condition, constrained collective options, whether of nations, state or classes, even as it generated myths of escape and defiance. The past century or so has seen plenty of such myths, which have mobilized large numbers of people in projects that have, in one way or another, been contained and undermined by the constraints of a more powerful modernity. The same fate would appear, with all its variants, to be awaiting Islamism. Like other movements of mobilization and protest, of left or right, Islamism has drawn on very real tensions within the societies it influences and will, beyond what it has already achieved, be able to establish states that reflect its ideology. Yet it is in several respects incapable of escaping from modernity, even as it rails against it: in terms of technology, economics, the acquisition and retention of power, and, as we have seen, ideology itself, it has no choice but to use the instruments which are there, even as it is itself incapable of generating an autonomous, or alternative, policy in these regards. Suppressed as these may now be by the conformities of protest and revolution, there are strong currents in these societies which seek not greater difference, or return to an imagined past, but incorporation into the world of industrialization, consumerism and greater individual freedom. The tension between the hybrid challenge to modernity, evident in the official policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the desire of the population for security, freedom and greater wealth (good old enlightenment goals) is clear enough. If those wishes are not allowed to come into the open, it is in part because the Islamic state has available to it instruments and practices of an eminently secular and moder kind to suppress them.
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